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Abstract 
Audio recorded by hidden listening devices can provide powerful evidence in criminal trials. Unfortunately 
these covert recordings are often indistinct, to the extent the court needs a transcript to understand the 
content. Australian law allows police to provide transcripts as ‘ad hoc experts’. Legal procedures 
incorporate safeguards intended to ensure the transcripts are not misleading. The problem is that these 
safeguards have been shown to be ineffective, with multiple examples of inaccurate transcripts being 
provided to ‘assist’ the jury in determining what is said and who is saying it. The present paper explains 
the problem, provides an accessible overview of the nature of speech and how speech perception works, 
and outlines the solution proposed by the Research Hub for Language in Forensic Evidence to the 
‘acoustic injustice’ embodied in current legal procedures. 
This journal article is available in Law Text Culture: https://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc/vol24/iss1/16 
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Acoustic injustice: The experience of 
listening to indistinct covert recordings 
presented as evidence in court
Helen Fraser and Debbie Loakes1 
1.  Introduction
One of the most important acoustic experiences in court is that of 
listening to covert recordings. Covert recordings are conversations 
captured by telephone intercept or a hidden listening device, without 
the knowledge of the participants. When used as evidence in a criminal 
trial, covert recordings allow the court to have the experience of 
‘hearing with their own ears’ as speakers make admissions they would 
not make openly. This can provide powerfully persuasive evidence, 
exerting a strong influence on anybody exposed to it: lawyers, judges, 
even journalists and other commentators – but most importantly, on 
the jury.
The very power of covert recordings also gives them the potential 
to be powerfully misleading, if the evidence they present is erroneous 
(Fishman 2006). For this reason it is essential that the jury reach a 
reliable understanding regarding who is speaking, and what they are 
saying. Hearing spoken language accurately can be difficult under any 
circumstances (Burridge 2017). Yet a common characteristic of covert 
recordings creates a particular problem: since it is hard to record good 
quality audio in secret, the content is often indistinct, to the extent it 
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cannot be understood without assistance. 
In such cases, Australian law allows the jury to be provided with 
several kinds of assistance, the most important of which is a transcript 
setting out relevant utterances, and attributing each to a speaker. Of 
course, the law recognises that it is essential to ensure the court is not 
inadvertently misled by the ‘assistance’ of an unreliable transcript. To 
avoid this, a number of safeguards have been developed (discussed in 
more detail below). However, these safeguards rely heavily on lawyers 
and other listeners experiencing a sense of personal confidence that 
they hear the content represented by the transcript in the audio. 
Unfortunately, as the present paper explains, this experience of personal 
confidence is known to be surprisingly unreliable, creating actual and 
potential injustice (Fraser 2018a). 
These and other issues prompted Australian linguistic scientists 
to raise a Call to Action – a 2017 letter, endorsed by all four national 
linguistics organisations, asking the judiciary to review and reform 
the handling of indistinct covert recordings in four main areas: 
transcription of English language utterances, translation of non-
English utterances, attribution of utterances to speakers, and admission 
of ‘enhanced’ versions of the audio (Fraser 2018b). The present paper 
focuses on just two of these areas: identifying who is speaking and what 
is being said in indistinct English audio. It starts with a brief overview 
of issues related to covert recordings, first from a legal perspective, and 
then from a linguistic science perspective. Next it calls attention to the 
mismatch between these perspectives, and the problems that result 
from that mismatch, first in relation to determining what is said, and 
then in relation to attributing relevant utterances to particular speakers. 
Finally, it describes the ‘acoustic injustice’ arising from the mismatch, 
and indicates the way forward recommended by Australian linguists.
2.  Covert recordings in legal perspective 
A basic legal principle is that understanding spoken or written 
English requires only common knowledge. This means that, whereas 
DNA, fingerprints and other kinds of forensic evidence require specialist 
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interpretation, covert recordings are expected to be understood directly 
by the jury – much as they understand the statements of witnesses 
testifying in person. This is part of what makes covert recordings such 
powerful evidence: admissions the jury may hear can be considered 
to be direct, as opposed to circumstantial, evidence (see for example 
Martin 2014: 340).
An obstacle arises when (as often happens) recordings are so 
indistinct that the jury cannot understand the content simply by 
listening as the audio is played in court. This is where current Australian 
law, following the landmark High Court decision in Butera v DPP 
(1987), allows assistance to be provided in the form of a transcript, 
setting out what is said in the recording and attributing each utterance 
to a speaker. For English language recordings, the transcript is typically 
created by detectives from the case, who are deemed to be ‘ad hoc 
experts’ on the grounds that they have gained specialised knowledge 
in relation to the audio by listening to it many times (Edmond et al 
2009). Of course the risk is recognised that police transcripts might not 
always be fully accurate, and important precedents have established a 
number of safeguards to mitigate the risk (for example Eastman v the 
Queen [1997]; R v Cassar [1999]).
The first, crucial, safeguard is the expectation that the defence will 
listen to the audio carefully, check the police transcript critically, and 
bring any differences of opinion to the attention of the prosecution. 
Another safeguard is the expectation that, in the event of differences 
not resolvable between the parties, the judge will listen personally 
at a voir dire. If the judge detects specifically misleading elements, 
the transcript can be excluded. However, the normal expectation is 
that evaluation of competing transcripts should be left as a matter for 
the jury, on the grounds that, since understanding English language 
requires only common knowledge, the jury is in the best position to 
determine the content of an indistinct covert recording, taking into 
account all the evidence and advice provided throughout the trial.
To ensure they do this properly, the final and most important 
safeguard is the judge’s instruction to the jury that they should not 
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simply accept the transcript, but must listen carefully to the audio and 
reach their own conclusion regarding what is said and who says it, using 
the transcript(s) only as an aid (this is the ‘aide memoire instruction’). 
These procedures have been routine for more than thirty years, and 
are familiar and uncontroversial from the perspective of Australian 
law. Nevertheless, from the perspective of linguistic science, they are 
deeply concerning. 
3.  Linguistic science perspective
3a) Common knowledge vs linguistic science
Over recent decades, linguistic science has found that many widely 
held beliefs about language and speech are false (Bauer et al1998). 
Unfortunately, relevant findings have been slow to percolate through 
to the broader community. This means that confident false beliefs 
about language and speech remain widespread, even among educated 
professionals, including lawyers, and scientists from other disciplines. 
This section gives a brief informal overview of findings relevant to 
the present discussion (for more detail see Fraser 2014 and references 
therein).
3b) The nature of speech 
An important characteristic of spoken language is that it is 
ephemeral: utterances disappear before listeners have a chance to study 
them in detail. Nowadays we have recording technology that lets us 
capture and analyse speech, but for many centuries, the only way to 
preserve a record of what was said was via writing. Written language 
developed in many forms around the world (Daniels et al 1996), with 
profound consequences, not just for the societies that use it (Olson 1994) 
but for their conception of speech itself (Harris 1986). In our society, 
alphabetic literacy has promoted the belief that speech is much like 
printed text: a sequence of discrete words, each made up of a sequence 
of discrete, invariant ‘sounds’ or, more technically, ‘segments’ (Linell 
1988). However this belief, though widespread, is quite false (for 
engaging and accessible discussion, see Port 2007).
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Through careful auditory analysis, linguists have long known that 
individual segments actually have a far greater range of variation than 
listeners realise (Bloomfield 1933). This variation is usually explained 
as being due to ‘coarticulation’ between neighbouring sounds (for 
example the /s/ in ‘sue’ is subtly different from the /s/ in ‘sea’, due to 
coarticulation with the subsequent lip-rounded vowel). 
During the 1940s-60s, development of technology for recording 
speech and analysing its acoustic structure showed that segmental 
variability was far greater than previously recognised (Shankweiler 
et al 2015). Further research spurred by this discovery demonstrated 
the ‘alphabetic conception’ of speech to be thoroughly misleading 
(Appelbaum 1999). In reality, speech is not a sequence of discrete units, 
but a continuous stream of sound, reflecting the dynamic and highly 
variable processes by which it is articulated (Ladefoged et al 2012). A 
small impression of its nature can be given by considering it to be more 
like ‘running writing’ than printed text. However, even the clearest of 
speech is like extremely messy running writing – with no spaces even 
between words, let alone between letters. This means that, amazing 
as it might seem, there is no set of acoustic features that is always and 
only associated with any particular segment (in more technical terms, 
there is no 1:1 relationship between any unit of acoustics and any unit 
of perception).
This raises the question of how listeners perceive the words and 
segments they are so keenly aware of in experience. While there are 
many competing theories, there is broad agreement regarding basic 
principles (Magnuson et al 2013).
3c) How speech perception works
For proficient speakers, understanding spoken language seems 
so effortless it is often assumed to be a simple process of recognising 
‘sounds’ (‘c-a-t’) and putting them together into words (‘cat’). However, 
the discovery, discussed in the previous section, that segments do not 
exist independently even in clear speech, shows that this assumption 
must be false. Actually, speech perception involves not recognising 
sounds but constructing them, via a suite of complex (though almost 
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entirely unconscious) mental processes. Its effortlessness is testament 
not to its simplicity, but to the immense proficiency speakers develop 
over years of practice (Cutler 2012).
The ability to recognise and discriminate segments is strongly 
dependent on this proficiency (this is why it is so difficult to identify 
sounds in a foreign language). Even local dialect proficiency can be 
relevant. For one example, even in Australia, where dialect differences 
are minimal, listeners from southern Victoria may be unable to 
discriminate words like ‘celery’ and ‘salary’, which those from northern 
Victoria readily hear as different (Loakes et al 2014). 
Even for proficient speakers, however, the acoustic information in 
the continuous stream of speech is not enough on its own to enable 
words to be recognised. This is often found hard to believe, but is 
easy to demonstrate by excising words or phrases from a recorded 
conversation. Words that are perfectly clear when heard in the context 
of the conversation are typically unintelligible when played on their 
own (Shockey 2003). In order to understand speech, listeners must 
combine the acoustic information in each word with information 
from other sources – and everyday conversation offers many other 
sources of information. Within speech itself, there is a great deal of 
‘suprasegmental’ and ‘paralinguistic’ information – rhythm, intonation, 
voice quality and other characteristics that extend beyond individual 
words, making speech a far richer and more complex signal than can be 
captured with a segmental (alphabetic) representation (Clark et al 2007)
In addition, listeners can use visual information to see who is 
speaking, and, by following speakers’ gaze or gestures, identify objects 
or events they refer to. Information from the facial expressions that 
accompany speech are particularly salient (Diehl et al 2005). One 
interesting example is the ‘McGurk effect’, whereby perception of the 
same acoustic information can be radically changed by superimposing 
video of speakers articulating /ba/, /ga/ or /fa/ (it is worth experiencing 
this in multimedia).2 
The need to juggle so much information from disparate sources 
means that speech perception is prone to a surprising number of errors 
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(Shockey et al 2014). Most are barely noticed, since they are corrected on 
the fly, as part of the perceptual process. As the unfolding speech creates 
its own internal context, listeners simply update their understanding, 
only mentioning transient errors if they happen to be humorous (for 
example ‘I thought you asked me to send an all-star female – but 
then I realised you must have meant all-staff email’). On the rare 
occasion that hearing-errors create genuine misunderstanding, they 
are readily corrected via intervention from the interlocutor, allowing 
the conversation to continue seamlessly.
Considering the nature of speech, however, what is surprising is 
not that so many hearing-errors occur, but rather that errors are not 
more frequent, and more disruptive. Why, for a simple example, do we 
readily seize on the phrase ‘recognise speech’, without even noticing 
that ‘wreck a nice beach’ is an equally plausible way to interpret the 
acoustic information? The reason is found in what is perhaps the most 
intriguing, though least observable, source of information needed 
for speech perception: the listener’s tacit and constantly updating 
expectations about what the upcoming speech is likely to be about. 
These expectations guide or ‘prime’ perception in ways that are hard to 
recognise except via experimental studies that control listeners’ access 
to contextual information (Warren 2012). 
In short, speech perception is far from the ‘direct’ observation of 
sounds and words assumed by the legal perspective. It is an active, 
dynamic, predictive, collaborative process, in which segmental acoustics 
plays an important but relatively minor role. Its key characteristic is 
listeners’ use of inference, interpretation and feedback in constructing 
a meaningful and contextually relevant message. The only difference 
from other inferential reasoning is that it mostly occurs without 
conscious awareness.
3d) Listening to recorded speech
A major benefit of recording technology is the ability to make speech 
available to listeners who are not physically present (for example via 
radio broadcast). At first this was limited to prepared monologues. 
Producing recordings of speakers in spontaneous conversation had to 
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await technology to record and mix high quality audio from multiple 
microphones. Even now that the technology is available, recording 
intelligible audio requires management. For example, a radio talk-show 
host has to ensure participants speak one at a time, minimise overlaps 
and interruptions, mention speakers’ names frequently, and so on. 
Without such intervention, conversation is typically difficult to follow 
from a recording, even if it was perfectly clear to the participants. The 
reason is that the recording takes speech out of its context, denying 
listeners the visual information they use in everyday conversation to 
identify speakers and resolve overlapping utterances. This is why the 
well-known ‘cocktail party effect’, whereby listeners can focus their 
attention on speech in a noisy environment does not work for recorded 
speech (Arons 1992).
Another benefit of improved recording techniques has been its 
enabling of advanced research on discourse and conversation analysis, 
which has given insight into the structure of conversation (Sidnell et al 
2012), and the nature of spontaneous speech (Shockey 2003). One key 
observation from this research is that conversational speech is highly 
elliptical. Since speakers know that listeners can retrieve information 
from the context, they do not bother to specify every detail. In a 
recording, however, the omitted information is no longer retrievable, 
making the speech hard to understand. To extend the analogy with 
running writing, it could be said that listening to a (high quality) 
recorded conversation is like reading a Twitter thread rendered in 
extremely messy handwriting with no gaps between words or letters 
– incomprehensible without contextual information. 
The interesting thing is that such a recording is less difficult to 
understand than the analogy might suggest. The reason is that, where 
listeners do not have access to the real context, they use more abstract 
contextual information obtained from external sources. This has 
been demonstrated by numerous experiments. In one example, from 
Germany, researchers played the same recording to several groups of 
listeners, priming each group with different information regarding 
the speaker’s regional dialect (Jannedy & Weirich 2014). Though 
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the priming was very subtle (the region was not referred to explicitly, 
merely noted on the response sheet), participants heard the speech in 
line with expectations about how speakers from that region pronounce 
particular words. Similarly strong perceptual effects have been shown 
for Australian and New Zealand listeners, using even subtler priming 
(Hay et al 2006). 
Experiments like these show the strong assistance provided by 
contextual priming, without the listener’s conscious awareness. Other 
research has added an important new concept. While contextual 
priming is generally helpful in everyday life, listeners’ heavy reliance 
on its assistance creates a perceptual vulnerability in understanding 
recorded speech. Priming with inaccurate contextual information 
does not, as might be expected, reduce understanding. Rather it 
encourages confident but inaccurate understanding. The effect is that 
listeners can be easily and unwittingly manipulated into confident 
but erroneous perception, especially if the audio has any degree of 
indistinctness (Fraser 2014 discusses all this in detail, while videos at 
forensictranscription.net.au provide compelling multimedia examples). 
These and many other demonstrations show that the risk of 
perceptual error is far higher for recorded conversation than for in-
person conversation – and of course the most important feature of 
a recording is that the speaker is not available to provide immediate 
feedback regarding errors that cause misunderstanding.
3e) Transcribing recorded speech
One further benefit of recording technology is the possibility for 
official events such as court or parliamentary proceedings to be captured 
in full detail. Useful as such recordings are, however, they are not 
nearly so convenient as the written documents traditionally provided by 
stenographers. For this reason, audio recordings are usually transcribed, 
to provide a ‘verbatim’ record. 
Transcribing any recorded spoken interaction is difficult. Depending 
on the various factors discussed above, simply understanding the 
content of the discourse can be hard enough. Writing down each and 
every word can be extremely challenging (further demonstration, if 
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needed, that understanding does not result from simple ‘bottom up’ 
recognition of readily observable segments). However, the range of 
difficulty spans a long continuum. While it definitely requires more 
than common knowledge, producing transcripts of recorded court 
proceedings is at the ‘relatively easy’ end of that continuum.
For one thing, court recordings are generally of at least fair quality, 
and the speech is monitored to ensure that only one voice is heard at 
a time (the judge in a courtroom performing a similar function to 
that of the radio host mentioned earlier, by reminding witnesses to 
answer verbally rather than with gestures, asking for difficult words 
to be spelled out, and so on). For another thing, the transcriber 
is trained in the use of appropriate equipment, and provided with 
background information to assist with difficult material (for example 
names of speakers and technical terms). Interestingly, even with all 
these advantages, initial versions of court transcripts often contain 
errors. Fortunately, they can usually be checked by the participants, 
and corrections made.
Importantly, however, even the best court transcript is far from 
being truly ‘verbatim’. This was discovered by sociolinguistics 
researchers who sought to use existing transcripts as the basis for 
analysis of courtroom discourse (Eades 1996). The very ‘tidiness’ 
that is valued in court transcripts is a disadvantage for research, as it 
omits or alters many of the very features of natural spoken language 
that researchers most want to study (Voutilainen et al 2019). Various 
researchers’ need for transcripts that include all the detail relevant 
for their studies has led to development of many different forms of 
transcript, suited to the objectives of different disciplines (Heselwood 
2013). All are valuable for their purposes. However, no transcript, no 
matter how detailed or how accurate, is ever equivalent to the recording 
(much less to the original discourse) – as can easily be demonstrated by 
reading the transcript aloud and comparing the result with the audio 
(Komter 2019 takes up this topic in a highly relevant study). This is not 
a criticism of transcribers. It merely demonstrates that any transcript 
requires abstracting from the rich and complex recording to create an 
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artefact suitable for a particular purpose – in much the same way as any 
map requires abstracting from the terrain it represents (Dibiase 2018). 
Lack of recognition of the abstract nature of transcripts creates 
major problems in court, even for overt recordings (Haworth 2018). 
Covert recordings raise far more serious issues.
4.  Forensic transcription 
4a) A highly specialised task requiring independence, skill and 
process
With the background above, we can turn to consider transcription 
of indistinct covert recordings. Clearly, the task is far harder than 
transcribing court recordings. On first acquaintance, the main reason 
appears to be the poor quality of the audio. It is true that indistinct 
covert recordings are typically of far worse quality than anything that 
is normally transcribed for court (or other) purposes – and ‘enhancing’ 
techniques are rarely, if ever, fully effective (Fraser 2020a). 
However, audio quality is only one of the features that make 
forensic transcription different from court transcription, and not the 
most important. Another difference is that covert recordings usually 
feature unmonitored conversation, often with multiple participants who 
share enough contextual knowledge to let them use highly elliptical 
expressions. As we have seen, even in a good quality recording, such 
material is hard to understand (our analogy likened it to a Twitter 
thread, rendered in messy handwriting with no spaces). A poor quality 
recording greatly exacerbates the difficulty (as if the messy handwriting 
was rendered in pale ink on thin paper that has become soiled and 
damaged). In order to understand material like this, listeners must have 
contextual information. Without it, as discussed earlier, the audio is 
simply unintelligible.
This highlights one of the most important differences between 
court transcription and forensic transcription: in the latter, the context 
may not be known, or if it is, relevant aspects may be contested, or 
simply wrong. This creates the risk of the transcriber being exposed 
to unreliable contextual information. As we have seen, unreliable 
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contextual information is liable to induce inaccurate perception – 
resulting in an inaccurate transcript. Unfortunately, even ensuring 
the transcriber receives only reliable contextual information does not 
guarantee accurate perception. The only way to be absolutely sure a 
transcript is reliable is by checking it against ‘ground truth’ (accurate, 
uncontestable knowledge of what was really said). This raises the most 
crucial difference between forensic and other transcription: ground 
truth is not available – that is why it is necessary to task the jury with 
determining what was said, using the transcript as assistance. 
For all these reasons and more, forensic transcription is not 
just harder than court transcription. It is actually harder than the 
transcription undertaken by advanced researchers in conversation 
analysis or phonetic science. We end with one final consideration: the 
consequences of error. In forensic transcription the stakes are far higher 
than in academic research. To avoid serious injustice, it is essential to 
avoid any possibility of misleading the jury with unreliable ‘assistance’.
From the perspective of linguistic science, then, it is clear that 
achieving appropriate reliability for forensic transcription requires 
independent transcribers with demonstrable skill, following an 
evidence-based process that provides them with necessary, relevant and 
reliable contextual information, while shielding them from misleading 
or biasing assumptions, at least until they have formed their own 
preliminary interpretation of the audio (cf Dror et al 2015). Clearly 
there is a major mismatch between this practice, required from the 
perspective of linguistic science, and the practice currently used in 
Australian courts as outlined in Section 2 above.
4b) Mismatch between legal perspective and linguistic science 
perspective
While the discussion above is far from a full explanation of issues 
in forensic transcription, it may give some insight into why linguistic 
scientists are so concerned about current legal practice: it embodies a 
paradoxical situation, whereby unusually difficult audio, used in contexts 
where the consequences of error are unusually severe, is transcribed 
and evaluated by personnel with unusually low qualifications (‘listening 
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many times’ is necessary but not sufficient: it is quite possible to be 
wrong every time).
The reason for the mismatch can be traced to a major error in the 
fundamental principle on which legal practice is based: the concept that 
understanding spoken language requires only common knowledge. This 
may be reasonable in relation to some forms of speech in some contexts 
(for example, listening to court proceedings). However, extending it to 
the assertion that understanding indistinct covert recordings requires 
only common knowledge involves a serious fallacy.
Ensuring reliable understanding of indistinct covert recordings 
requires advanced expertise of a level similar to that required for 
DNA or other expert evidence (Fraser 2018b). The difference is that, 
where DNA evidence is opaque to the court in the absence of expert 
interpretation, listening to an indistinct covert recording may give 
listeners an experience of understanding the content for themselves. 
However, this ability to ‘hear with one’s own ears’ does not make 
the evidence ‘direct’ – it merely hides crucial inferential reasoning 
below the level of conscious awareness (Section 3c). This makes it 
even more essential with audio than with DNA to protect juries from 
misleading ‘assistance’, by ensuring they are only ever exposed to 
reliable transcripts.
Current law, however, allows police transcripts to ‘assist’ juries. 
This is problematic, not just because police lack genuine expertise 
in transcription. Police transcribers are further hindered by having 
contextual information that is potentially unreliable (having not 
yet been tested by the trial process). As we have seen (Section 3d), 
while contextual information can confer useful insight regarding the 
interpretation of particular indistinct phrases, it is equally possible that 
it will mislead perception. And indeed it is known that police transcripts 
are frequently inaccurate (French and Fraser 2018).
So while police suggestions should certainly form part of the input, 
at an appropriate stage, to an expert transcription process, ensuring their 
suggestions are not misleading requires specialist evaluation. The law, 
however, leaves evaluation to lawyers. Most of the safeguards (Section 
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2) involve lawyers experiencing a sense of personal confidence that the 
police transcript assists their own perception (Gray 2018). The problem, 
as explained above, is that this experience is highly unreliable. The effect 
is that listeners are unlikely to detect and correct all relevant errors.
That in turn means it is common for juries to be given erroneous 
police transcripts, with only the aide memoire instruction to protect 
them from being misled (Fraser 2018b). Unfortunately, this final 
safeguard too is unrealistic. As explained in Section 3d, a transcript 
inevitably has a powerful and lasting effect on perception of indistinct 
audio, even if it is inaccurate. It is very unlikely listeners will successfully 
‘reset’ their perception to give equal consideration to alternative 
interpretations – making the aide memoire instruction one more way 
in which juries are asked to ‘do the impossible’ (cf Tiersma 2009). The 
overall effect is extraordinary privilege for the police interpretation of 
indistinct covert recordings. 
Lacking insight into the factors that affect speech perception, the 
law has invested unwarranted confidence in police transcripts, both 
in specific cases and in general. Since the transcript is not considered 
to be evidence, but only ‘assistance’ in understanding the evidence, 
police ‘ad hoc experts’ are subject to none of the scrutiny that genuine 
expert evidence is given (Roberts 2020). There are known examples 
of demonstrably inaccurate police transcripts having been admitted 
as assistance to the jury despite careful checking by lawyers and even 
judges – and it is certain there are more, as yet unknown (Fraser 2018a). 
The threat to justice is evident.
5.  Speaker attribution 
This section turns from the question of what was said to consider 
difficulties in establishing, with reliability appropriate for a criminal 
trial, who said it.
5a) Linguistic science perspective
We all have the daily experience of recognising the voices of people 
we know. The fact that we are usually right gives confidence in listeners’ 
ability to recognise speakers by their voices. It also gives confidence 
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in the ‘common knowledge’ explanation for the ability: voices have 
unique features which listeners come to recognise, through familiarity. 
However, both of these concepts have been shown to be incorrect. 
First, speakers do not have unique voices (Rose 2002, Watt et al 
2020). This is one reason that responsible experts deprecate the term 
‘voiceprint’, and its suggestion of an analogy with fingerprints (the 
technical term is ‘spectrogram’). There is of course a great deal of 
variation between the voices of different speakers. However, voices 
are highly complex signals that also vary greatly within the speech of 
any individual: consider the difference in the voice of the same person 
speaking angrily to a colleague, formally to a boss or lovingly to a child. 
It is well known, from twin studies and other research on similar-
sounding speakers, that within-speaker variation can be as great as or 
greater than between-speaker variation (Loakes 2008, in press) – and 
that is without even considering the possibility of deliberate disguise. 
This counter-intuitive fact is confirmed by the observation that there 
are currently no methods that allow reliable identification of a voice 
from an open population in anything remotely like what is possible 
with fingerprints (Foulkes et al 2012) – and it is useful to recall that 
even fingerprint identification is far from infallible (Campbell 2011, 
Walvisch 2017). The increasing success of voice verification services (for 
example for lodging tax claims by telephone) depends on reducing the 
population of possible speakers by requiring input of personal details 
such as date of birth and tax file number. It also simplifies the task by 
requiring the speaker to cooperate in producing standard phrases for 
comparison. While the results are impressive (though not foolproof), 
such constraints make the methods unsuitable for forensic purposes.
Second, while listeners certainly do recognise speakers’ voices, they 
do not recognise speakers by their voices. As with speech perception, 
speaker recognition relies far more heavily than listeners realise on 
priming by contextual expectations. Experiments that deprive listeners 
of contextual information, forcing them to use only the voice itself, 
show surprisingly poor performance, and, importantly, poor correlation 
between listeners’ confidence and accuracy (Kreiman et al 2011). This 
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is why earwitnesses, who identify speakers based on memory of having 
‘heard that voice before’, are even less reliable than eyewitnesses (Fraser 
2019) – and eyewitnesses, as is well known, are notoriously fallible 
(Gould et al 2012).
Third, while having a recording of an offender’s voice reduces the 
need to rely on a listener’s memory, it is by no means a panacea for the 
problems of unreliable speaker identification. The handwriting analogy 
we have been developing might help explain this. If clear speech is like 
messy running writing with no gaps, then identifying voices is at least 
as problematic as identifying authorship of a handwritten text – a task 
for which common knowledge notoriously overestimates reliability, 
and even experts are surprisingly fallible (Found et al 2013). In fact, 
even in clear recordings, recognising voices is far more problematic 
than recognising handwriting, due to listeners’ poor ability to provide 
valid descriptions even of apparently basic features like pitch or accent 
(Tomkinson et al 2018). The fact that covert recordings are often 
indistinct only adds to these problems (making it like recognising the 
author of messy handwriting in pale ink on thin, soiled paper).
With this brief background, we can review the legal perspective 
on identifying speakers whose voices are heard in covert recordings.
5b) Legal perspective
Utterances in covert recordings are generally attributed to specific 
speakers as part of the police transcript. In addition, investigators may 
testify as ‘ad hoc experts’ that they recognise voices in covert recordings, 
on the grounds that familiarity with the voices, gained through their 
work on the investigation, gives them specialised knowledge. However, 
as discussed above, no one can reliably identify voices from an open 
population. Familiarity may assist in some cases, but is no guarantee 
of accuracy (Yarmey 2004), especially in cases where cognitive bias 
may be a factor (Smith et al 2014).
For many types of covert recordings, there is also external evidence 
regarding the identity of the speakers, for example from personal 
surveillance, or from information about time, location and phone 
numbers in intercepted calls. While these kinds of external evidence 
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are obviously useful in themselves, it is important not to misunderstand 
their relationship to the evidence obtained from the voices themselves. 
It is often assumed that such external evidence confirms investigators’ 
voice recognition. However, this could only be (potentially) correct 
if investigators first recognised the voices independently, and then 
reviewed the external evidence. Of course, this is not what happens in 
practice: the whole basis of investigators’ ‘ad hoc expertise’ is (putative) 
familiarity with the voices gained through their work on the case as 
a whole. It seems clear that in many or most cases, what really helps 
investigators identify speakers is the external evidence, with the 
voice characteristics adding confirmation. This is not necessarily a 
problem in itself. The problem is the fallacious assumption, which 
gives unwarranted confidence in the ability of police to identify 
speakers, both in specific cases and in general. The effect of this circular 
reasoning is to give yet more privilege to the police interpretation of 
covert recordings. 
Recent years have seen more frequent use of expert witnesses in 
relation to speaker identification. Unfortunately, however, it can be 
difficult for the courts to distinguish real expertise from pseudoscience, 
and even genuine expert opinion is seen only as an alternative to the 
police identification, with the choice between them left to the jury 
(Edmond et al 2011). As a consequence, multiple cases of ‘acoustic 
injustice’ are known (Catanzaro 2015). 
5c) Capabilities and limitations of expert analysis
While voices cannot be uniquely identified from an open population, 
there is still a great deal of useful evidence that expert analysts can 
provide (Foulkes et al 2012), usually by comparing voice samples from 
an ‘unknown’ or ‘disputed’ recording (typically featuring one or more 
offenders’ voices) with a sample from a ‘known’ recording (typically 
from a police interview, or some other context where the speaker can 
be unequivocally identified).
An essential consideration in making this kind of comparison (Rose 
2002), as in any forensic comparison evidence (Aitken et al 2010), is 
to avoid the common pitfall of focusing on similarities between the 
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known and unknown samples, with insufficient consideration of the 
distinctiveness of the similar features. For a simple example, consider an 
unknown sample featuring a male voice with an average pitch around 
120 Hz. The fact that the known sample features a male voice with 
a similar average pitch is not, in itself, of much forensic value, since 
many male voices have this pitch. The principle is the same as in the 
intuitively more obvious case of an offender and a suspect both having 
brown hair: this similarity is of limited value – unless the population of 
possible offenders can be reduced in some reliable way to include very 
few people with brown hair, making this a distinctive characteristic.
However, forensic voice comparison is substantially more 
problematic than other types of superficially similar expert evidence. 
One reason is the very large overlap of within-speaker and between-
speaker variability already mentioned, which affects almost every 
characteristic of voices. This makes it essential, but difficult, to ensure 
samples are fully commensurate (i.e. that known and unknown 
samples compare like with like). It also makes it very difficult to collect 
population statistics for specific voice characteristics, and to use them 
in meaningful ways (Morrison et al 2016).
For these and other reasons, despite extensive research, we still have 
nothing like a standard method for forensic voice comparison, certainly 
not one that can be applied in a context-independent manner (Gold 
et al 2019). In most cases, reliable information about other evidence 
in the case is needed to narrow the population of possible speakers. 
Unfortunately, it is still not entirely clear how best to enable experts 
to make use of reliable information about the case, while minimising 
the risk of cognitive bias (Kinoshita et al 2015). This and many other 
issues are still under active discussion by researchers.
Another issue is the diff iculty of determining the ‘defence 
hypothesis’. Statistical comparison of samples requires determining a 
‘likelihood ratio’ representing the likelihood of observing the data under 
competing hypotheses. While the prosecution hypothesis is generally 
straightforward (‘the known and unknown samples were produced 
by one and the same speaker’), specifying the defence hypothesis in a 
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valid way is surprisingly problematic, since ‘not produced by the same 
speaker’ is insufficient for statistical analysis (Hughes et al 2018).
A further problem is the difficulty of determining which specific 
utterances should rightly be included in the ‘unknown’ sample. In 
many cases, the unknown sample comprises more than one utterance 
– sometimes spread over multiple recordings, and often occurring 
within complex conversations featuring numerous voices in indistinct 
audio – all of which makes speaker attribution highly problematic. 
Yet it is surprisingly common for expert analysts simply to accept the 
police-attributed voices as the unknown sample (Fraser 2018c).
Finally, it is worth remembering that the point of expert evidence is 
not for the expert to reach a reliable conclusion, but for the jury to reach 
a reliable conclusion – or at least, perhaps more importantly, to prevent 
the jury from reaching a misleading conclusion. Communicating 
complex scientific results involving advanced statistics to a jury is a 
major hurdle for any field of forensic science (Martire 2018). Again, 
these difficulties are magnified for speaker comparison evidence, 
especially by the fact that it is so easy for listeners to ‘reach their own 
conclusion’ about speech evidence, with insufficient recognition of how 
often their ‘own conclusions’ are confident but wrong.
Expert evidence is a useful and necessary, but partial, corrective to 
problems of current legal practice regarding identification of speakers 
in covert recordings (McGorrery et al 2016). It might be preferable 
to aim for practices that reduce the mismatch between legal and 
linguistic perspectives on voice evidence – via the collaborative research 
recommended by proponents of the Call to Action (Fraser 2018b). 
6.  Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated several kinds of acoustic injustice 
arising from misconceptions within the law that allow a transcript to 
be treated merely as ‘assistance’ rather than as evidence in its own right. 
We end by reflecting on a quote from the Washington Law Review 
more than a decade ago:
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Rather than treating a transcript as a non-evidentiary “aid to 
understanding” the recording […], a transcript of a recording should 
be recognized for what it is, i.e., opinion evidence as to the contents 
of the recording, and its admissibility should be governed by the 
same rules and procedures that apply to opinion evidence generally. 
(Fishman 2006: 523)
While we agree wholeheartedly with the first point, we note that 
the powerful effect a transcript can exert on listeners’ perception of who 
is speaking and what is being said means that ‘procedures that apply to 
opinion evidence generally’ may not be enough to solve the problems 
identified above. Finding an adequate solution requires linguistics, 
law and law enforcement working together to develop and implement 
transparent, evidence-based procedures that ensure all covert recordings 
are provided with a demonstrably reliable transcript before they enter 
the trial process. The Research Hub for Language in Forensic Evidence, 
established as a direct result of the successful Call to Action discussed 
above, seeks to develop a collaborative research program to achieve 
this (Fraser 2020b). 
Endnotes
1. Though the first author wrote the text, both authors contributed equally 
to the content.
2. Experience the McGurk effect here: https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=2k8fHR9jKVM.
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